The Syllabus for Philosophy 188

The syllabus has been modified to take account of the additional time we spent on formal material surrounding Tarski's theory of truth. The original syllabus is still available here.

8 March

Hartry Field, "Tarski's Theory of Truth", Journal of Philosophy (1972), pp. 347-75. (PDF)

For a very different sort of view, Donald Davidson, "True to the Facts", in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation.

What does Field think Tarski was trying to do? Why is this an important thing to do? Plainly, Field does not think Tarski succeeded: What does he think needs to be done to complete Tarski's project? Does Field's distinction between 'T1' and 'T2' reflect something present in Tarski's work? If so, can we acknowledge this distinction and its import without accepting physicalism?

10 March

Discussion

13 March

John Etchemendy, "Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence", Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (1988), pp. 57-79, esp. section 1. (PDF, JSTOR)

John Etchemendy, The Concept of Logical Consequence (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); Scott Soames, "What is a Theory of Truth?" Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29, and Understanding Truth (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

Etchemendy is critical of philosophers who find Tarski's work to be of philosophical value. What value does he think Tarski ascribed to his work? What criticisms does Etchemendy make of the claim that Tarski's work on truth is of substantial philosophical importance? What does he think is needed instead of, or in addition to, Tarski's theory of truth?

15 March

The Tarskian Hierarchy (No Readings)

17 March

Michael Glanzberg, "The Liar in Context", Philosophical Studies 103 (2001), pp. 217-51. (PDF, Springer)

Charles Parsons, "The Liar Paradox", in his Mathematics in Philosophy, pp. 221-67; Tyler Burge, "Semantical Paradox", Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979), pp. 169-98.

What is the 'strengthened liar paradox' and what problem does Glanzberg think it raises? What is the Tarskian 'hierarchy' and what is Glanzberg's attitude towards it? What problem does Glanzberg think the liar paradox really raises?

20 & 22 March

Saul Kripke, "An Outline of a Theory of Truth", Journal of Philosophy (1975), pp. 690-716, esp. pp. 690-702. (PDF)
Do not worry yet about the more mathematical parts of Kripke's paper. We will discuss those separately.

What are Kripke's main objections to Tarski's treatment of truth? Why does this lead Kripke to search for a way of allowing a language 'to contain its own truth-predicate'? What does Kripke think our most central intuitions about truth are? How are these related to Convention T? How do these central intuitions motivate the notion of groundedness, and what is its role in Kripke's theory?

Topics for second short paper distributed

24 March

Discussion

27-31 March

Spring Break

3, 5 and 7 April

Handout: Kripke's Theory of Truth (PDF, Postscript)

Truth and Inductive Definability (Handout); Solomon Feferman, "Toward Useful Type-free Theories, I", Journal of Symbolic Logic 49 (1984), pp. 75-111, 1984; Melvin Fitting, "Note on the Mathematical Aspects of Kripke's Theory of Truth", Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (1986), pp. 75-88; Michael Kremer, "Kripke and the Logic of Truth", Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (1988), pp. 225-78; Vann McGee, "Applying Kripke's Theory of Truth", Journal of Philosophy 86 (1989), pp. 530-9.

10 & 12 April

Hartry Field, "Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content", Mind 103 (1994), pp. 249-85. (PDF)

Hartry Field, "The Deflationary Conception of Truth", in G. MacDonald and C. Wright, eds., Fact, Science and Morality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), pp. 55-117; Hartry Field, Truth and the Absence of Fact (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001); Paul Horwich, Truth (Cambridge MA: Blackwell, 1990); Dorothy Grover, Joseph Camp, and Nuel Belnap, "A Prosentential Theory of Truth", Philosophical Studies 27 (1975), pp.73-125; Dorothy Grover, A Prosentential Theory of Truth (Princeton NJ: Princteon University Press, 1992).
Field has recently developed an interesting, but extremely complex, formal theory of truth. See "A Revenge-Immune Solution to the Semantic Paradoxes", Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (2003), pp. 139-77. The view has since evolved, and grown even more complex. See the material available on Field's web site.

What is the primary motivation for Field's view? What does he take to be the most serious challenge to it? Why do context-dependence, ambiguity, and the like pose a problem for his view? How does he propose to resolve that problem?

14 April

Discussion

Second short paper due

17 April

Richard Heck, "Truth and Disquotation", Synthese 142 (2004), pp. 317-52. (PDF, Springer)

Hilary Putnam, "Does the Deflationary Theory of Truth Solve All Philosophical Problems?", "On Truth", and "A Comparison of Something with Something Else", in his Words and Life (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 264-78; John O'Leary-Hawthorne and Graham Oppy, "Minimalism and Truth", Nos 31 (1997), pp. 170-196.

Heck argues (i) that we do not "need" a disquotational truth-predicate, (ii) that "true" does not express a disquotational truth-predicate, and (iii) that it is unclear that we understand any disquotational truth-predicate. What is the significance of each of these three claims for deflationism? To what extent is it a problem for Heck's argument that it turns so heavily upon context-dependence?

19 April

Michael Glanzberg, "Minimalism, Deflationism, and Paradoxes", forthcoming in Deflationism and Paradoxes, ed. B. Armour-Garb and J. C. Beall, Oxford University Press). (PDF)

Vann McGee, "Maximal Consistent Sets of T-Sentences", Journal of Philosophical Logic 21 (1992), pp.235-41; Anil Gupta, "A Critique of Deflationism," Philosophical Topics 21 (1993), pp. 57-81. Keith Simmons, "Deflationary Truth and the Liar", Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (1999), pp. 455-488.

Glanzberg argues that the liar paradox poses a special problem for deflationism: What problem is that?

21 April

Discussion

24 April

Donald Davidson, "The Folly of Trying to Define Truth", Journal of Philosophy 93 (1996), pp.263-78.

Donald Davidson, "Truth and Meaning", "True to the Facts", "In Defense of Convention T", "Radical Interpretation" and "The Method of Truth in Metaphysics", in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation.

How does Davidson think the concepts of truth and meaning are related? In what way does he think Tarski's work can be applied in the study of meaning? Does Davidson think that this study of meaning will, at the same time, throw light on the concept of truth?

26 April

David Wiggins, "What Would Be a Substantial Theory of Truth?", in Zaak vanStraaten, ed., Philosophical Subjects (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 189-221.

Donald Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge", in E. LePore, ed., Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).

Wiggins wants to suggest that a broadly Davidsonian approach to questions about meaning will, in the end, throw a great deal of light on the concept of truth. In particular, Wiggins wants to suggest:
1. that a proper account of meaning requires a theory which yields theorems of the form
"Snow is white" is φ if, and only if, snow is white
2. that truth should be identified with whatever is best suited to play the role of φ here
3. that such theories should be evaluated in terms of their capacity to help us 'make sense' of speakers

The first and third claims are essentially Davidson's. Why does Wiggins make the second claim? What does he think we can say about truth, simply on the basis of these three claims? What important claims about truth does he think do not follow just from these three claims?

28 April

Discussion

Problem Set Due

9 May

Final Paper Due

The Philosophical Significance of Tarski's Theory of Truth
8 March	Hartry Field, "Tarski's Theory of Truth", Journal of Philosophy (1972), pp. 347-75. (PDF) For a very different sort of view, Donald Davidson, "True to the Facts", in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. What does Field think Tarski was trying to do? Why is this an important thing to do? Plainly, Field does not think Tarski succeeded: What does he think needs to be done to complete Tarski's project? Does Field's distinction between 'T1' and 'T2' reflect something present in Tarski's work? If so, can we acknowledge this distinction and its import without accepting physicalism?
10 March	Discussion
13 March	John Etchemendy, "Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence", Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (1988), pp. 57-79, esp. section 1. (PDF, JSTOR) John Etchemendy, The Concept of Logical Consequence (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); Scott Soames, "What is a Theory of Truth?" Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29, and Understanding Truth (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). Etchemendy is critical of philosophers who find Tarski's work to be of philosophical value. What value does he think Tarski ascribed to his work? What criticisms does Etchemendy make of the claim that Tarski's work on truth is of substantial philosophical importance? What does he think is needed instead of, or in addition to, Tarski's theory of truth?
15 March	The Tarskian Hierarchy (No Readings)
17 March	Michael Glanzberg, "The Liar in Context", Philosophical Studies 103 (2001), pp. 217-51. (PDF, Springer) Charles Parsons, "The Liar Paradox", in his Mathematics in Philosophy, pp. 221-67; Tyler Burge, "Semantical Paradox", Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979), pp. 169-98. What is the 'strengthened liar paradox' and what problem does Glanzberg think it raises? What is the Tarskian 'hierarchy' and what is Glanzberg's attitude towards it? What problem does Glanzberg think the liar paradox really raises?
Kripke's Theory of Truth
20 & 22 March	Saul Kripke, "An Outline of a Theory of Truth", Journal of Philosophy (1975), pp. 690-716, esp. pp. 690-702. (PDF) Do not worry yet about the more mathematical parts of Kripke's paper. We will discuss those separately. What are Kripke's main objections to Tarski's treatment of truth? Why does this lead Kripke to search for a way of allowing a language 'to contain its own truth-predicate'? What does Kripke think our most central intuitions about truth are? How are these related to Convention T? How do these central intuitions motivate the notion of groundedness, and what is its role in Kripke's theory? Topics for second short paper distributed
24 March	Discussion
27-31 March	Spring Break
3, 5 and 7 April	Handout: Kripke's Theory of Truth (PDF, Postscript) Truth and Inductive Definability (Handout); Solomon Feferman, "Toward Useful Type-free Theories, I", Journal of Symbolic Logic 49 (1984), pp. 75-111, 1984; Melvin Fitting, "Note on the Mathematical Aspects of Kripke's Theory of Truth", Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (1986), pp. 75-88; Michael Kremer, "Kripke and the Logic of Truth", Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (1988), pp. 225-78; Vann McGee, "Applying Kripke's Theory of Truth", Journal of Philosophy 86 (1989), pp. 530-9.
Deflationism
10 & 12 April	Hartry Field, "Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content", Mind 103 (1994), pp. 249-85. (PDF) Hartry Field, "The Deflationary Conception of Truth", in G. MacDonald and C. Wright, eds., Fact, Science and Morality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), pp. 55-117; Hartry Field, Truth and the Absence of Fact (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001); Paul Horwich, Truth (Cambridge MA: Blackwell, 1990); Dorothy Grover, Joseph Camp, and Nuel Belnap, "A Prosentential Theory of Truth", Philosophical Studies 27 (1975), pp.73-125; Dorothy Grover, A Prosentential Theory of Truth (Princeton NJ: Princteon University Press, 1992). Field has recently developed an interesting, but extremely complex, formal theory of truth. See "A Revenge-Immune Solution to the Semantic Paradoxes", Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (2003), pp. 139-77. The view has since evolved, and grown even more complex. See the material available on Field's web site. What is the primary motivation for Field's view? What does he take to be the most serious challenge to it? Why do context-dependence, ambiguity, and the like pose a problem for his view? How does he propose to resolve that problem?
14 April	Discussion Second short paper due
17 April	Richard Heck, "Truth and Disquotation", Synthese 142 (2004), pp. 317-52. (PDF, Springer) Hilary Putnam, "Does the Deflationary Theory of Truth Solve All Philosophical Problems?", "On Truth", and "A Comparison of Something with Something Else", in his Words and Life (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 264-78; John O'Leary-Hawthorne and Graham Oppy, "Minimalism and Truth", Nos 31 (1997), pp. 170-196. Heck argues (i) that we do not "need" a disquotational truth-predicate, (ii) that "true" does not express a disquotational truth-predicate, and (iii) that it is unclear that we understand any disquotational truth-predicate. What is the significance of each of these three claims for deflationism? To what extent is it a problem for Heck's argument that it turns so heavily upon context-dependence?
19 April	Michael Glanzberg, "Minimalism, Deflationism, and Paradoxes", forthcoming in Deflationism and Paradoxes, ed. B. Armour-Garb and J. C. Beall, Oxford University Press). (PDF) Vann McGee, "Maximal Consistent Sets of T-Sentences", Journal of Philosophical Logic 21 (1992), pp.235-41; Anil Gupta, "A Critique of Deflationism," Philosophical Topics 21 (1993), pp. 57-81. Keith Simmons, "Deflationary Truth and the Liar", Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (1999), pp. 455-488. Glanzberg argues that the liar paradox poses a special problem for deflationism: What problem is that?
21 April	Discussion
24 April	Donald Davidson, "The Folly of Trying to Define Truth", Journal of Philosophy 93 (1996), pp.263-78. Donald Davidson, "Truth and Meaning", "True to the Facts", "In Defense of Convention T", "Radical Interpretation" and "The Method of Truth in Metaphysics", in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. How does Davidson think the concepts of truth and meaning are related? In what way does he think Tarski's work can be applied in the study of meaning? Does Davidson think that this study of meaning will, at the same time, throw light on the concept of truth?
26 April	David Wiggins, "What Would Be a Substantial Theory of Truth?", in Zaak vanStraaten, ed., Philosophical Subjects (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 189-221. Donald Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge", in E. LePore, ed., Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986). Wiggins wants to suggest that a broadly Davidsonian approach to questions about meaning will, in the end, throw a great deal of light on the concept of truth. In particular, Wiggins wants to suggest: 1. that a proper account of meaning requires a theory which yields theorems of the form "Snow is white" is φ if, and only if, snow is white 2. that truth should be identified with whatever is best suited to play the role of φ here 3. that such theories should be evaluated in terms of their capacity to help us 'make sense' of speakers The first and third claims are essentially Davidson's. Why does Wiggins make the second claim? What does he think we can say about truth, simply on the basis of these three claims? What important claims about truth does he think do not follow just from these three claims?
28 April	Discussion Problem Set Due
9 May	Final Paper Due

Philosophy 188: Syllabus